One definition of power might be “how much an
actor, be it person or state can forward their will and/or act either without
significant opposition or with the ability to disregard opposition.” This power
can be expressed through “hard” or “soft” means, “hard” being militaristic or
forceful, and “soft” being the idea of cultural and diplomatic cooperation
(Agnew 875). This loosely (perhaps too
loosely) invites the idea that hegemony is soft power control of markets and
ideas, and empire is hard power control of territory and nations. This of
course begs the question as to whether hegemony is achieved by empire, and at least to
an extent it would seem so. However, there may be another way of looking at the
relationship of empire and hegemony—not as opposing ideas, but instead as
consecutive ideas. While creation of empire is arguably also to create
hegemony, modern events might well suggest that hegemony creation has rewards
of its own: increased power allowing for unhindered empirical actions.
Immanuel Wallerstein argues that hegemony is “one
state . . . able to impose its set of rules on the interstate system, and
thereby creates temporarily a new political order” (Scheidel 4). This implies
that this sort of soft power reorganizes an existing economical or political
structure of a region or group of states to favor the one state’s agenda. In
this case, holding the high cards (e.g. natural resources) is nice, but making
the rules on how, when, and where the cards can be played is a far more
preferable and superior position. By this a hegemon, through soft power can
arrange a system that narrows the options for opposing agendas set forth by
other states or non-state actors. If this is the case, then hegemony helps
dictate future responses, and sets a precedent for future actions by those
under the umbrella of its own authority and influence.
This level of hegemonic influence isn’t necessarily a
moral force in and of itself, but rather a stage for the actions and values of
the hegemon. It’s possible to argue over whether or not states should possess
such power and influence, but the focus here is instead to ask what states can
do with said power. Agnew divides this expression of power into two themes, “involving
either relatively benign (or even sacrificial) ‘leadership’ or profoundly
exploitative relationships based on steep power gradients between a hegemon and
its subordinates in a hierarchy of power” (Agnew 876). One expression of
“benign” leadership might be seen in “Operation Unified Response”, the US
humanitarian mission to Haiti after the 2010 earthquake near Port-au-Prince.
The hegemonic power of the US in the region allowed for the greatest
organization of aid, and the US worked to ensure that although troops were on
the ground, they did not interfere with Haitian politics, nor did they stay
long. It would be naïve to assume that this was entirely based on good will;
merely being the hegemon in the region dictates a certain necessity and expectation
of humanitarian response. Likewise being the recipient of such a benefit
implies the need of the beneficiary to remember the hegemon’s interests and
preferences in the future. Even so, this sort of qui pro quo arrangement (though unspoken) is a reflection of
benign, soft power.
On the other hand, Agnew calls negative expression of
this power “profoundly exploitative” as hegemonies engage in practices that
have little semblance of concern for states under the umbrella of the hegemon. Worse,
in such a situation the dominant power often has relatively little commitment
to the weaker states. However, this approach seems to rest on the idea of
hegemony as the end goal. There may be another approach to consider, one with
far more serious consequences: not empiricism to gain hegemony, or even
exploitative hegemony, but rather hegemony being used as a means to control the
game to the point where all options are viable options—including those that
abuse power and state sovereignty. One such example of this might be seen in
modern events: Russia as a hegemonic power and its current relationship to
Ukraine.
In recent years Russia has emerged as a renewed
hegemonic power. Vladimir Putin’s brokering of the Syrian quasi-disarmament
deal certainly lent credence to the idea of his extensive regional authority.
However, this authority has been expressed more recently and extensively in
Ukraine itself. In December 2013, the Kremlin bought $15 billion in Ukrainian
bonds, and cut natural gas prices by a third for Ukraine according to
EUbusiness. The move was to save Ukraine $7 billion alone on the natural gas
purchases, arguably a good deal for the struggling nation. However, this move
was at the very least somewhat exploitative, or possibly even predatory. Maria
Lipman expressed no doubts as to the motives when she said, “This is not done
out of the kindness of Putin's heart. This is to strengthen Russian influence
over Ukraine and make the country more dependent on Russia" (“Putin . . .
”). EUbusiness also affirmed this idea by stating, “Putin will above all gain a new economic foothold in Ukraine” further reinforcing the idea
that at the very least Russia, and Putin in particular, hold to an idea of
hegemony that is even stronger than Wallerstein’s (“Putin . . .”).
Just how much stronger has been revealed in the last month,
and in particular the 48 hours. As protestors opposing the pro-Russia regime gained
the upper hand the president of the country fled, and the opposition installed
a new, more pro-EU, pro-western government after the state failure of February
2014.
On
Friday, February 28, US President Barack Obama warned Russia against violating
Ukraine’s state sovereignty, but by Saturday night the Crimea region was in
Russian control (Smale). Obama made a 90-minute call to Putin on Saturday,
March 1 opposing Russian troop presence and control of the Crimea region and
government buildings (Smale). Thus far Russian forces and leadership have not
yielded on any front.
This then is where the idea of
hegemony leading to empiricism takes shape. Russia acted in a hegemonic manner
with the last Ukrainian regime that was loyal to the Kremlin, but the ousting
of this regime has forced their hand. When
Ukrainian leadership was allied with Moscow the norm of was for Moscow to use
economics as the means of control. Now that power has shifted to a party that
seeks membership at the EU table, Putin seems determined to bring Ukraine back
to his own table. Carnegie analyst Maria Lipman foreshadowed this with her
prerevolutionary statement, “from Putin's point of view, it is absolutely
unacceptable to lose control over Ukraine" (“Putin . . .”). At the time
this could only be read as an indicator of strong hegemony politics, but time
iteself has revealed a deeper meaning. Russia may have established itself as a
hegemonic power in the region, but it revealed empirical motives and methods when
soft-power politics failed. Russia’s military presence in Ukraine is vastly
different from the US military in Haiti in the aforementioned example. The US
presence was finite in Haiti from the beginning and exclusively for
humanitarian aid, whereas Russian forces have no withdrawal date and their
mission is to secure control for pro-Russian factions in Ukraine. By doing so,
Russia has moved from merely hegemonic maneuvering to empirical action in
Ukraine.
In conclusion, hegemony is soft
power control and influence that can be used for positive and negative
purposes. Russia engaged in the more powerful methods of hegemonic influence
with Ukraine, but switched to empiricism once soft power was no longer
expedient. Arguably Putin has taken Russia to a place of powerful hegemony,
where others may oppose or speak out against his actions, but the true show of
his hegemonic power is revealed when he can ignore the outcry of the
international community and advance an agenda of empiricism. Russian hegemony
has allowed the country to write the rules of the regional game; with the final
rule changing exactly which game is being played. Perhaps traditional wisdom
suggests that empires are built to gain hegemony, but it may well be that
Russia has attained hegemony to build its empire. How far this power goes will
be revealed in the backlash, or lack thereof from the international community
as time unfolds.
Works Cited
"Putin Bails out Ukraine to Assert
Kremlin Power." EUbusiness. EUbusiness Ltd, 18
Dec.
2013. Web. 01 Mar. 2014. <http://www.eubusiness.com/news-
eu/ukraine-unrest-debt.sbq>.
Scheidel, Walter. "Republics
between Hegemony and Empire." Princeton.edu.
Princeton
University, Feb. 2006. Web. 28 Feb. 2014.
<http://www.princeton.edu/~pswpc/pdfs/scheidel/020601.pdf>.
Smale, Alison, and David M.
Herszenhorn. "Kremlin Clears Way for Force in Ukraine;
Separatist
Split Feared." The New York Times. The New York Times, 01 Mar.
2014.
Web. 01 Mar. 2014.
<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/02/world/europe/ukraine.html?hp>.
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